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Human Nature in Politics brings the competences and perspectives of law, philosophy and political science to bear on an imporant subject seldom treated at book length. The subject of human nature in politics is as old as systematic thought about politics. Out of favor for a period in modern times, it is now once more the subject of attention by political theorists who often borrow heavily from the disciplines of biology and psychology. The plurality of their approaches and insights is reflecteed in Part I of the book: Perspectives on Human Nature . Although appeals to human nature have histori.

Defining the scope of the Constitution's application outside U.S. territory is more important than ever. In February, the Supreme Court heard oral argument about whether the Constitution applies when a U.S. officer shoots a Mexican teenager across the border. At the same time, federal courts across the country scrambled to evaluate the constitutionality of an Executive Order that, among other things, deprived immigrants of their right to reenter the United States. Yet the extraterritorial reach of the Due Process Clause—the broadest constitutional limit on the government's authority to deprive persons of "life, liberty, or property"—remains obscure. Up to now, scholars have uniformly concluded that the founding generation did not understand due process to apply abroad, at least not to aliens. This Article challenges that consensus. Based on the historical background, constitutional structure, and the early practice of federal law enforcement on the high seas, this Article argues that the founding generation understood due process to apply to any exercise of federal law enforcement, criminal or civil, against any person anywhere in the world. Outside the context of war, no one believed that a federal officer could deprive a suspect of life, liberty, or property without due process of law— even if the capture occurred abroad or the suspect was a noncitizen. This history supports generally extending due process to federal criminal and civil law enforcement, regardless of the suspect's location or citizenship. This principle has immediate implications for cross-border shootings, officially sponsored kidnappings and detentions abroad, the suspension of immigration benefits, and the acquisition of foreign evidence for criminal defendants.

The issue of evolution instruction in American public schools is becoming increasingly complex, both legally and politically. Until recently, the controversy over whether and how to teach evolution in public school science classes has been singularly focused on the constitutional limits of government support for religion under the First Amendment's Establishment Clause. Current measures in Louisiana and Texas, however, represent a shift toward a new "adjudicative model" for addressing questions of evolution instruction. This adjudicative model permits individual educators to treat evolution issues on a case-by-case basis, which, in turn, implicates a new constitutional issue in the evolution education debate: procedural due process. By creating powerful disincentives for anti-evolutionist policymakers, procedural due process concerns could affect the future of evolution education even more profoundly than does the Establishment Clause. This Essay explores the relationship between evolution education policy and procedural due process by first identifying and defining the adjudicative model. It then considers the model's constitutional ramifications for evolution instruction, concluding that this new approach to policymaking introduces procedural due process concerns that radically alter the legal and political calculus of the debate over evolution education.